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Abstract
This article provides new evidence on the important role of institutional investors
in affecting corporate strategy. Institutional cross-ownership between two firms not only
increases the probability of them merging, but also affects the outcomes of mergers and ac-
quisitions (M&As). Institutional cross-ownership reduces deal premiums, increases stock
payment in M&A transactions, and lowers the completion probabilities of deals with neg-
ative acquirer announcement returns. Furthermore, deals with high institutional cross-
ownership have lower transaction costs and disclose more transparent financial statement
information. The effect of cross-ownership on the total deal synergies and post-deal long-
term performance is positive, which can be attributed to independent and non-transient
cross-owners. Our findings are robust after mitigating the cross-ownership asymmetry con-
cern. Overall, our results suggest that the growth of institutional cross-holdings in U.S.
stock markets may greatly change corporate strategies and decision-making processes.
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1 Introduction
Previous studies suggest that institutional ownership keeps growing in U.S. stock markets
and has an important role in both corporate strategy and equity pricing (e.g., Allen, 2001;
Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Bethel et al., 2009; Rydqvist et al., 2014; McCahery et al., 2016).
Institutional investors manage portfolios that are not only much greater in financial terms than
those of most retail investors, but also contain much larger numbers of stocks.1 Compared
to retail investors, there is a much higher probability that institutional investors will become
owners of the stocks on both sides of a proposed merger deal – i.e., they hold shares in both
the acquirer and the target. In the context of mergers and acquisitions (M&As), this is termed
an “institutional cross-holding.”
In this paper, we investigate the externality of institutional cross-holdings for corporate
strategies through an important corporate event: M&As. Unlike non cross-owners, who only
hold the stock on one side of a merger deal, cross-holders tend to make decisions from a broader
perspective that nets off any potential losses from one side (usually the acquirer) with gains
made on the other (usually the target) and will consider how the newly formed joint entity
would sit within their portfolios compared with the two existing separate stocks. Therefore,
cross-holders may have different information sets, different incentive structures and may make
different choices than those that would have arisen for single stock holders of either acquirers or
targets. Furthermore, institutional cross-owners may have an important governance role in the
M&A process, reducing information asymmetry and mitigating the bargaining and transaction
costs that would normally arise between entirely independent parties.2 Understanding whether
and how institutional cross-ownership affects M&A decision making and deal outcomes are, by
1Over the 1980-2010 period, on average, a representative institution held 219 stocks in a portfolio with the
market value of $2.5 billion (Zeng, 2016).
2A typical example where institutional cross-owners have influenced an M&A deal is Tesla’s acquisition of
SolarCity in 2016. According to Thomson Reuters (June 21, 2016) and the Wall Street Journal (July 19, 2016),
45% of Tesla’s shareholders hold SolarCity’s stock and three of Tesla’s top five institutional investors are also
among SolarCity’s top five institutional investors. Top cross-owners like Fidelity even expressed a willingness
for a “potential future partnership” between the two firms a long time before the deal announcement. Tesla’s
CEO, Elon Musk, also admitted that “institutional shareholders had some idea of the plan (acquisition)”, and
“this idea has been bandied about with some of our largest shareholders, institutional shareholders. Yeah, there
have been discussions”. The deal was finally approved by over 85% of unaffiliated shareholders.
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themselves, of particular importance.
Empirically observing the effects of institutional cross-holdings on intercorporate activities
is extremely difficult because the bulk of these activities takes place behind closed doors. More-
over, it is difficult to separate the impact of institutional investor activism from the myriad
of other factors that could have caused the same outcomes.3 M&A events present a natu-
ral arena within which to test the effect of cross-holdings on corporate strategy since they
represent identifiable events and cross-holdings are observable in both acquirers and targets.
Cross-owners may be actively involved in the M&A decision-making process because these deals
have substantial impacts on the wealth of both acquirers and targets.
This paper provides direct answers to two main research questions. We first examine
whether institutional cross-ownership increases the likelihood of two given firms merging in
the first place. One possibility is that institutional cross-ownership establishes a connection
between two firms and facilitate their merger, similar to the mechanism of board member
social connections (Ishii and Xuan, 2014) or common auditors (Cai et al., 2016) between the
acquirer and target documented in recent M&A studies. The other possibility is that cross-
ownership between two firms may deter them from merging. Cross-owners may benefit from the
diversification of their investment among different firms. From a cross-owner’s point of view,
there is a trade off between the benefits of cross-holding and the costs of under-diversification
(He and Huang, 2017). In addition, Azar et al. (2017) document that common ownership in
the U.S. airline industry increases market concentration and deters competition. If common
owners can affect the product prices of their holding firms and already benefit from less product
market competition, they may have less incentive to approve a merger.
We next investigate how institutional cross-ownership affects actual M&A deal outcomes
and performance. One hypothesis is that institutional cross-holdings are mainly due to the rise
of institutional investors (Gompers et al., 2003) and the growth of index or quasi-index tracking
3For example, activist shareholders often take the credit for improvements in a firm’s environmental perfor-
mance following a disaster, but it appears likely that such a firm, when faced with negative publicity, severe
reputation damage and a variety of unhappy stakeholders, would have taken positive steps to fix the problem
anyway (e.g., Haigh and Hazelton, 2004).
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funds (Harford et al., 2011) in U.S. stock markets. Additionally, a single institutional cross-
owner may not act differently from other institutional non cross-owners because its holdings
of acquirer and target stocks may be asymmetric (Harford et al., 2011). Under this view,
institutional cross-ownership should have no effect at all on M&A deal outcomes.
An alternative hypothesis is that extensive institutional cross-ownership between acquirers
and targets leads to inferior M&A deal outcomes, such as lower acquirer announcement returns;
there are several reasons for this. First, the conflict of interest between institutional cross-
owners and other institutional owners who hold either acquirer or target stocks alone may
have negative externalities for corporate strategies. Second, acquiring firm managers aiming
to build an empire would choose targets with high institutional cross-ownership only because
they will encounter less resistance in deal negotiations and not because these targets are the
most appropriate when viewed from other perspectives. Third, institutional cross-ownership
may create negative managerial behavioral traits, such as familiarity biases or predisposition
to the availability heuristic,4 under which acquirers only bid for familiar firms and forgo other
potential targets.
The second alternative hypothesis is that there is a positive association between institu-
tional cross-ownership and M&A deal outcomes. This viewpoint also receives intuitive support
from three perspectives. First, institutional cross-owners may act as an information bridge be-
tween acquirers and targets and foster an enhanced information flow. Information asymmetry
between acquirer and target shareholders is one of the primary causes of M&A failure (Dong
et al., 2006). An example of institutional cross-owners helping to reduce information asymme-
try is that they play a “bridge-building” role for firms competing in a product market. Because
institutional cross-owners have economies of scale in information production, cross-held firms
within the same product market have more collaborative and innovative activities (He and
Huang, 2017).
Second, institutional cross-owners can monitor the managers of both acquirers and targets.
4Tversky and Kahneman (1973), for example, provide evidence on the availability heuristic based on several
experiments.
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More broadly, the effectiveness of the equity market is built on the premise that shareholders
possess an important role in corporate governance, ensuring that firms maximize the interests of
shareholders. Yet the literature highlights that different shareholder groups may have divergent
incentives and may fulfill this monitoring role to varying degrees of effectiveness. Institutional
investors who engage in monitoring activities will have the ability to influence management
directly and will also have access to superior and more timely information (e.g., Martin, 1996;
Carleton et al., 1998; Chen et al., 2007). Furthermore, institutional cross-owners may benefit
from internalizing the corporate governance externality among peer firms held in their portfolios
(He et al., 2017), that is, an improvement in a firm’s governance leads to an improvement in
governance in the firms within the same industry. Compared to other institutional investors,
cross-owners have lower information collection costs and better incentives to monitor M&A
deals because they have their feet in both the acquirer and target companies.
Third, the existence of institutional cross-owners impacts upon M&A deal negotiations.
There is already evidence to suggest that close connections between the boards of the acquirer
and the target (where, for example, there is a board member in common), helps acquirers to
reduce their takeover premiums due to reduced information asymmetry and reduced competi-
tion from less informed potential outside bidders (e.g., Cai and Sevilir, 2012; Guo et al., 2015).
Acquiring firm shareholders who also cross-hold shares in the targets may help facilitate deal
negotiations, obtain better terms for acquirers and better enable the integration of the con-
stituent firms. In addition, it is likely that institutional cross-owners know more about deal
quality than other investors in the market. Therefore, institutional cross-owners may prefer
certain deal characteristics to others – for example, regarding the method of payment.
Our paper is related to two studies on cross-ownership in M&As. Matvos and Ostrovsky
(2008) show that institutional investors as a whole do not lose money at the M&A deal an-
nouncement because many of them also hold target stocks, which potentially solves the puzzle
that institutional investors of acquirers approve deals with negative acquirer announcement
returns. The losses due to the decrease in acquirer stock prices will be compensated by the
gains due to the rise of target stock prices. Therefore, there is potentially a conflict of interest
4
between an acquirer’s institutional cross-owners and other investors. Matvos and Ostrovsky
(2008) find evidence in the shareholder voting data that mutual fund cross-owners tend to vote
for M&As with negative acquirer announcement returns, while mutual fund non cross-owners
tend to vote against these deals. Contrary to Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008), Harford et al.
(2011) argue that the aggregate wealth change across all cross-owners is not equivalent to indi-
vidual cross-owners’ wealth changes at the deal announcement. If the shareholdings of acquirers
and targets are asymmetric at the individual cross-owner level, one institutional cross-owner
may only effectively focus on their position in either the acquirer or the target. These two
papers examine the change of institutional cross-owners’ wealth at deal announcement but
hold different views of whether the existence of institutional cross-ownership can explain the
negative acquirer announcement returns.
Different from Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) and Harford et al. (2011), we do not try to
resolve the overall negative acquirer announcement return puzzle in M&As. Instead, we argue
that even though individual cross-owners may lose money at the deal announcement due to the
ownership asymmetry, they still have strong preferences towards their cross-held firms when
exerting their influence on M&As. Cross-owners can lose less in such deals through their stake in
the target and benefit from improved deal quality. To mitigate the cross-ownership asymmetry
concern indicated by Harford et al. (2011), we define alternative cross-ownership measures by
requiring cross-owners to hold at least 1% shares of both acquirers and targets and by counting
the number of cross-owners that are the top 5/10/20 largest owners of both acquirers and
targets. We investigate whether and how these institutional cross-ownership measures affect
the probability of M&A deal occurrence, deal characteristics, and combined wealth changes in
the merged firms. In this way, our paper emphasizes the importance of the institutional cross-
owner’s externality in M&A transactions, which may not be captured in the cross-owners’
wealth change at the deal announcement. We find that institutional cross-owners affect M&A
transactions along several dimensions. Our finding that institutional cross-owners facilitate
M&A deals is consistent with Matvos and Ostrovsky’s (2008) mutual fund voting studies.
Our paper is not contrary to Harford et al. (2011). Even though cross-ownership asymmetry
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indicates that institutional cross-owners have different interests in deal acquirers and targets, it
does not exclude the possibility that cross-owners may affect deal outcomes. Institutional cross-
owners may help to improve deal quality because they can alleviate information asymmetries
(He and Huang, 2017) and monitor both sides in M&As (He et al., 2017; Kang et al., 2017).
In our sample of 2,604 mergers between U.S. public firms from 1984 to 2014, we observe
that institutional cross-ownership is pervasive between acquirers and targets. On average,
18% of acquirer stocks are held by target institutional owners and 21% of target stocks are
held by acquirer institutional owners. Moreover, some institutional cross-owners hold a large
amount of both acquirer and target stocks. For cross-owners who have more than 1% owner-
ship in both acquirers and targets, they hold 8% of acquirer shares and 8% of target shares
on average. Among the top 10 acquirer institutional owners and top 10 target institutional
owners, the average number of institutional cross-owners is two. To examine the role of insti-
tutional cross-owners in M&As, we first show that the presence of institutional cross-ownership
between two firms increases the probability of a merger pair formation. Institutional cross-
ownership measures are higher in our actual M&A sample than those in matched firms selected
by bootstrapping with replacement from the sample acquirer or target’s industry. In addition,
candidate firms sharing large institutional cross-ownership with sample targets (acquirers) are
more likely to become actual acquirers (targets).
We next examine whether the existence of institutional cross-ownership affects M&A deal
outcomes. Using the takeover premium estimated by the transaction value in excess of target
market value or by the target three-day abnormal announcement return (CAR), we find that
acquirers with higher institutional cross-ownership pay lower premiums for targets. One more
institutional top 10 cross-owner reduces the transaction value relative to target market value
by 8.9% and the target CAR by 1.2%. We also find that acquirers with high institutional
cross-ownership tend to use more stock as the method of payment. One more institutional top
10 cross-owner increases stock payment by 4.3%. We show that the existence of institutional
cross-ownership reduces the completion probability of deals with negative acquirer CAR, but
has no effect on the completion probability of deals with positive acquirer CAR. One more
6
institutional top 10 cross-owner reduces the completion probability of negative CAR deals by
1.2%. To support the information bridge role of institutional cross-ownership in M&As, we
study the relationship between institutional cross-ownership and deal transaction costs. For an
average deal, we show that one more institutional top 10 cross-owner is associated with a $0.9
million reduction in acquirer financial advisor fees and a $1.0 million reduction in target financial
advisor fees. Finally, we document that a merged firm is less likely to restate its earnings if
institutional cross-ownership between the acquirer and the target is higher, suggesting that
institutional cross-owners may reduce deal uncertainty by deterring the chance of misreporting
earnings before M&As. One more institutional top 10 cross-owner reduces the probability of
earnings restatements by 1.3%. These results favor the view that institutional cross-owners
play an important role in corporate M&As.
Given the evidence that institutional cross-ownership fosters M&As and affects the trans-
actions along several dimensions, we further investigate the relationship between institutional
cross-ownership and M&A total deal performance. Our results indicate that M&A deal syner-
gies, measured by acquirer and target market value-weighted average announcement returns,
tend to be higher in the presence of many institutional cross-owners. One more top 10 insti-
tutional cross-owner is associated with a 2.0% increase in deal synergies. This supports the
view that the positive impact of cross-ownership outweighs any negative conflict of interest ef-
fects that might be present. To better understand the synergy result, we separate institutional
cross-owners by type and investigate whether this value creation is associated with a particular
group of institutional investors. We find no significant relationship between deal synergies and
grey cross-owner numbers and between deal synergies and transient cross-owner numbers. How-
ever, the effects of independent cross-owner numbers and non-transient cross-owner numbers
on deal synergies are significantly positive.5 To mitigate the endogeneity concern due to reverse
causality and potential omitted variables, we use indicator variables representing the switches of
acquirers and targets between the Russell 1000 index and the Russell 2000 index before the deal
5Grey institutions have business ties with their holding firms, while independent institutions do not (Almazan
et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007). We divide institutions into transient and non-transient ones according to Bushee’s
(1998) classification.
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announcement as instrumental variables. The positive relationship between deal synergies and
the number of cross-owners remains robust with the instrumental variable approach. Finally,
we explore whether the positive impact of cross-ownership extends to the post-deal long-term
performance. We show that various measures of post-deal long-term performance are positively
related to the numbers of independent and non-transient cross-owners.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant
literature and the possible role of institutional cross-owners in M&As. Section 3 discusses the
data collection and provides descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents empirical evidence on
how institutional cross-ownership is related to M&A deal probability and outcomes. Section 5
provides robustness test results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our paper contributes to three strands of the literature. First, to the recently developing
literature on the role of cross-owners in corporate activities. Jung (2013) finds that cross-
ownership provides a communication channel among firms and helps facilitate the diffusion of
disclosure practices. Anto´n et al. (2016) show theoretically and empirically that the common
ownership within an industry may affect top executives’ compensation. Chemmanur et al.
(2016) find that common blockholders with more than 5% holdings foster strategic alliances
between firms and further improve corporate innovation. Edmans et al. (2017) develop a theo-
retical model and show that investors who own multiple firms actually have more information
on their holdings and may choose to hold firms with higher quality. Therefore, common own-
ership actually improves corporate governance through both voice and exit channels. Azar
et al. (2017) find that common ownership affects U.S. airline companies’ flight ticket pricing
strategies. He and Huang (2017) document that firms with greater cross-holdings are associ-
ated with higher market share growth and more innovation productivity. He et al. (2017) show
that institutional cross-owners play a monitoring role and improve firm governance through
the externality of the governance improvement among peer firms in their portfolios. The cross-
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owners’ monitoring effectiveness is further supported by Kang et al. (2017) who attribute the
effectiveness of cross-owner monitoring to their information advantage and governance experi-
ence.
In addition to the modest literature on institutional cross-holdings, there is also some
research investigating the effect of direct inter-company share holdings, where one company
holds shares in another. This practice is common in Germany and Japan, but less so elsewhere
including the U.S. (Bøhren and Norli, 1997). One such situation where corporate cross-holdings
occur in the U.S. is in the context of “toehold” bidders, where firms that intend to make an
acquisition already hold a small percentage of the equity in the target firm. Toeholding is
increasingly rare in the U.S., however, but has been the subject of considerable research (e.g.,
Mikkelson and Ruback, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Betton and Eckbo, 2000; Goldman
and Qian, 2005; Povel and Sertsios, 2014).6 Our empirical evidence demonstrates that the
externality of general institutional cross-ownership also exists in M&A deals.
Second, our results add to studies investigating how the links between acquirers and tar-
gets impact M&A deal outcomes. For example, acquirer and target industry relatedness (Levy
and Sarnat, 1970); acquirers and targets funded by common venture capital (e.g., Gompers and
Xuan, 2008; Masulis and Nahata, 2011); supplier and customer relationships between merging
firms (Ahern and Harford, 2014); toeholds (e.g., Betton and Eckbo, 2000; Goldman and Qian,
2005); acquirer-target social ties through board directors and senior executives (e.g., Cai and
Sevilir, 2012; Ishii and Xuan, 2014); and common auditors (e.g., Cai et al., 2016; Dhaliwal
et al., 2016). Our paper documents that institutional cross-ownership, as a new link between
acquirers and targets, has a significant impact on M&As. A key difference between institutional
cross-ownership and the links documented in the previous literature is that at the outset we
are agnostic about the likely sign of the impact of cross-owners on M&A deal performance. On
the one hand, acquirers with significant cross-holdings in the targets are likely to hold supe-
rior information on the true value of the latter and institutional cross-ownership may mitigate
principal-agent problems arising from information asymmetries. Also, institutional cross-owners
6According to (Betton et al., 2009), only 13% of bidders for U.S. firms in the 1973–2002 period had toeholds.
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may monitor the managers of both acquirers and targets and offer more negotiation power to
acquirers. On the other hand, institutional cross-ownership may lead to more severe conflicts
of interest because the changes in institutional cross-owners’ wealth are a combination of the
changes in acquirer and target firm value at the deal announcement.
Third, our paper is related to studies examining the role of institutional investors in
corporate strategies and investment decisions. Previous studies find that some, but not all,
types of institutional investors exert influence on corporate strategies such as anti-takeover
amendments, R&D investment decisions, CEO compensation, corporate spin-offs, and earnings
management (e.g., Brickley et al., 1988; Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990; Bushee, 1998; Hartzell
and Starks, 2003; Abarbanell et al., 2003; Kim et al., 2016). As in M&As, Gaspar et al. (2005)
find that institutional investors with high-turnover portfolios exert little influence on managers
with regard to acquisition decisions. Chen et al. (2007) find that although the total institutional
holdings do not have a positive effect on post-merger performance, concentrated holdings by
independent long-term institutions do. Fich et al. (2015) show that institutional investors whose
holding value in targets are among the top 10% of stocks in their portfolios exert a monitoring
role in M&As and improve deal terms for targets. These studies suggest that the extent of the
presence of a certain subset of institutional investors may affect corporate strategies, rather than
all institutional holdings having a homogeneous effect. Our paper studies whether the variation
of another subset of institutions – institutional cross-owners – affects M&A deal performance
or not.
3 Sample selection and descriptive statistics
In this section we discuss our sample selection process and sample characteristics.
3.1 M&A sample selection
To conduct our analyses, we first select a sample of M&As from the Thomson Reuters Se-
curities Data Company (SDC) Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database with the following
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criteria. We start with all U.S. domestic M&As announced between 1984 and 2014. Our sample
begins in 1984 because the information in the SDC database is less reliable before this date
(Chen et al., 2007). We require both acquirers and targets to be U.S. publicly traded companies
so that we can calculate their institutional cross-ownership. Deal status is either completed
or withdrawn. We exclude transactions labelled as a minority stake purchase, acquisitions of
remaining interest, privatizations, repurchases, exchange offers, self-tenders, recapitalizations
or spin-offs. The percentage of target shares held by the acquirer must be less than 50% before
the transaction and at least 90% if the transaction is completed. Deals with missing transac-
tion value, with deal value less than $1 million and with relative size between acquirers and
targets below 5%7 are excluded from our sample. Finally, we limit our sample to deals in which
the acquirer has accounting data available from Compustat and stock data available from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
To examine the influence of institutional cross-ownership on deal performance, we link our
M&A sample with the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13F) database. Our
final sample includes 2,604 deals in which both acquirers and targets have institutional owners.8
Panel A of Table 1 provides the distribution of M&A deals by year. The maximum number
of deals per annum is 200 and the minimum number of deals per annum is 29. Consistent
with the merger wave literature, we observe that the number of deals peaks around 1997 and
2007 over our sample period. Panel B presents the distribution of M&A deals by Fama–French
10–industry classification based on acquirers’ SIC codes. Firms in the consumer nondurables,
consumer durables and manufacturing industries are most active in acquisition activities. These
two panels show that our sample is fairly representative and well diversified across different
industries. Both year and industry fixed effects are controlled for in our multivariate regression
7We choose the relative size between acquirers and targets to be 5% because institutional cross-ownership
plays a more important role in M&A when acquirers and targets have a similar size. However, our results are
qualitatively the same if we choose 1%, 10% or 20% as the relative size. The minimum deal value and relative
size are not the sample selection criterion in Harford et al. (2011). We add these two sample selection criterion
to exclude deals in which the targets are mechanically too small to matter for institutional cross-owners.
8The acquirers and targets of 123 deals in our sample do not share the same institutional owners. The
institutional cross-ownership measures for these deals are all, therefore, defined as zero. Our empirical results
are robust to the exclusion of these deals.
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analyses because M&A deal numbers vary notably across time and industry.
3.2 Sample descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of M&A deals in our sample. All variables
are defined in Appendix A. Panel A of Table 2 illustrates the summary statistics for the deal
performance-related variables. The acquirer CARs are on average negative around deal an-
nouncements. The mean (median) deal premium is 79% (47%) in our sample and the mean
(median) deal synergy gain is 4% (2%). 82% of the deals in our sample are successfully com-
pleted after the announcement. On average, the long-run abnormal returns of the completed
deals are around zero.
Panel B of Table 2 summarizes the institutional cross-ownership proxy variables. On av-
erage, 18% of the acquirer’s stock is owned by institutional investors who also own the equity
of targets (Ac CrossIO), while 21% of the target’s stock is owned by institutional investors
who also own the equity of acquirers (Ta CrossIO). After we apply a 1% ownership threshold
restriction on cross-ownership in acquirers and targets, Ac CrossIO 1% and Ta CrossIO 1%
have a mean of 8% and 8%, respectively. The market value weighted average of the acquirer and
target’s institutional cross-ownership (MVweighted CrossIO) has a mean of 19%. The mean
number of institutional investors who are within the top five/ten/twenty largest institutional
owners of both acquirers and targets (Top5/10/20Count) is 0.8/2.1/4.6. These summary statis-
tics suggest that institutional cross-ownership is pervasive among deal acquirers and targets in
our sample. Harford et al. (2011) argue that because individual institutional cross-owners’ hold-
ings are asymmetric between acquirers and targets, the average loss on acquirer announcement
returns cannot be simply explained by total institutional cross-holdings. By focusing on the in-
stitutional investors who are influential on both sides of M&A deals, our cross-ownership proxy
variables help us to mitigate the concern that cross-ownership is asymmetric and cross-owners
do not have an impact on both sides of M&A deals (Harford et al., 2011).9
9On average, institutional cross-owners who are within both acquirer and target’s 5/10/20 largest institu-
tional investors hold a total of 3.6%/6.6%/10.3% of acquirer stocks and 3.7%/6.7%/10.3% target stocks.
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Figure 1 presents the time series of institutional cross-ownership among the acquirers and
targets in our sample. The heights of the blue (green) bars represent the average numbers of
acquirer (target) institutional owners for all deals in each year. The heights of the red bars
represent the average number of institutional cross-owners for all deals in each year. Due to
the rise of institutional ownership in U.S. stock markets over our sample period, we observe a
clear increasing pattern for all three colored bars. Because acquirers are usually larger than the
corresponding targets in M&As, the average number of acquirer institutional owners is higher
than the average number of target institutional owners. The purple (red) colored line represents
the average ratio of institutional cross-owners to the number of acquirer (target) institutional
owners in each year. Both lines show that institutional cross-owners account for a significant
portion of acquirer and target institutional owners. For targets in particular, cross-owners
account for more than 40% of target institutional owners for all the sample period.
Panel C of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for deal and firm characteristics. Our
M&A sample is similar to those used in previous studies of M&As between U.S. public firms.
4 Main results
4.1 Institutional cross-ownership and M&A likelihood
In this section, we implement both univariate and multivariate analyses to study the effect
of institutional cross-ownership on the likelihood of two firms participating in M&As.
4.1.1 Institutional cross-ownership and M&A likelihood: Univariate tests
If the presence of institutional cross-ownership could have an impact on the probability
of a merger occurring in the first place, then the acquisition may be more or less likely to occur
between two firms that have a high institutional cross-ownership. Panel B of Table 2 presents
the average institutional cross-ownership between the acquirers and the targets in our sample.
We next compare these statistics to those estimated in our bootstrapped deal samples.
Following Ishii and Xuan (2014), we pair the acquirer of each sample deal with a random
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firm drawn from the sample target’s industry in the year of the deal announcement. We
bootstrap 500 targets with replacement for each deal and report the average institutional cross-
ownership calculated for these simulated parings in Panel A of Table 3. Across six different
institutional cross-ownership measures, we show that the observed level of institutional cross-
ownership between our sample acquirers and sample targets is higher than one would expect
from pairing actual acquirers with randomly drawn targets. Panel B of Table 3 reports the
average institutional cross-ownership between random acquirers and sample targets which we
construct by pairing each sample target with a random firm drawn (with replacement) from
the sample acquirer’s industry in the year of the deal announcement and repeat the procedure
500 times. The observed level of institutional cross-ownership in our sample is higher than
one would expect from randomly pairing potential acquirers with actual targets. Panel C of
Table 3 reports the average institutional cross-ownership between random acquirers and random
targets which we construct by pairing one randomly drawn (with replacement) firm from the
actual acquirer’s industry with one randomly drawn firm (with replacement) from the actual
target’s industry. The observed level of institutional cross-ownership in our sample is higher
than one would expect from randomly pairing potential acquirers with potential targets. To be
consistent with our sample selection criterion, we restrict the relative size between any pair of
acquirers and targets to be above 5% in our bootstrapped sample. Fama–French 10–industry
classification is used our univariate analysis.10
In summary, the univariate test results based on the bootstrapped samples suggest that
two firms are more likely to merge together in the presence of higher institutional cross-
ownership. However, the probability of a firm being an acquirer or a target may also depend on
firm characteristics that are not controlled for in our univariate tests. It is necessary to check
the robustness of our results in multivariate regression analyses.
10Our results are robust to all other Fama–French industry classifications.
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4.1.2 Probability of firms being acquirers/targets: Multivariate tests
Following Bodnaruk et al. (2009), Bena and Li (2014), and Cai et al. (2016), we estimate
the selection models of firms becoming acquirers or targets in M&As. We start by investigating
the relationship between institutional cross-ownership and the probability of a firm being an
acquirer. For each sample acquirer, we define the set of firms in the same Fama–French 10–
industry category of similar size (within a 20% band of market capitalization) and B/M (within
a 20% band of B/M ratio). Then we use cross-sectional data as of the fiscal year-end before
the deal announcement and run a conditional logit regression in which the dependent variable
is equal to one if a firm is a sample acquirer and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables
are institutional cross-ownership measures and a set of acquirer firm characteristics. For each
deal, there is one observation for the sample acquirer and multiple observations for the matched
firms. We control for deal fixed effects in all regressions. Table 4 indicates that institutional
cross-ownership between all potential acquirers and sample targets is positively related to the
probability of a firm becoming an acquirer. All coefficients of institutional cross-ownership
measures are positive and strongly statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table 5 presents coefficient estimates from the conditional logit regression to predict target
firms. To find firms similar to deal targets, we use the same matching criteria as in Table 4.
We show that there is a positive relationship between institutional cross-ownership and the
probability of a firm becoming a target, controlling for a set of target firm characteristics. All
coefficients of institutional cross-ownership proxies are statistically significant at the 1% level.11
Overall, the results provide answers to our first research question that institutional cross-
ownership increases the likelihood of two firms merging in the first place compared to other
potential firms with similar characteristics. In the rest of this paper, we will study our second
research question as to whether institutional cross-ownership has any effect on M&A deal
outcomes and performance.
11Our results in Tables 4 and 5 are robust if we exclude matched firms that do not have any institutional
cross-ownership with either deal acquirers or targets.
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4.2 Institutional cross-ownership and M&A deal outcomes
In this section, we examine whether the existence of institutional cross-ownership affects
several important M&A deal outcomes/characteristics.
4.2.1 Institutional cross-ownership and takeover premiums
The deal takeover premium represents how much an acquirer pays a target in excess of its
market value. We measure the deal takeover premium as the ratio between transaction value
and target market value four weeks before the deal announcement, subtracting one. Using this
takeover premium proxy as the dependent variable and our institutional cross-ownership proxies
as key independent variables, Columns (1)–(6) of Table 6 presents the multivariate ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression results on the relationship between institutional cross-ownership
and takeover premiums after controlling for acquirer and deal characteristics, as well as year and
industry fixed effects. We adjust the regression standard errors for heteroscedasticity following
White (1980).
The primary explanatory variables of interest are the institutional cross-ownership proxy
variables: Ac CrossIO, Ac CrossIO 1%, Mvweighted CrossIO and Top5/10/20Count. We
find that the takeover premium is negatively and significantly related to the institutional
cross-ownership proxies. Increasing acquirer institutional cross-ownership (Ac CrossIO) by
one standard deviation reduces the takeover premium by 26.4%. The marginal effect of one
more institutional top 10 cross-owner on the takeover premium is −8.9%. Thus the relationship
between institutional cross-ownership and takeover premiums is economically significant. This
finding suggests that acquirers actually benefit from institutional cross-ownership and do not
overpay targets.
The existence of institutional cross-owners between acquirers and targets may improve in-
formation flow and the efficiency of communication between them. Institutional cross-ownership
may also increase each firm’s knowledge and understanding of the other’s operations and cor-
porate culture. The information advantage of acquirers with more institutional cross-ownership
may help them to get better deal prices because they may have a bargaining advantage during
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the negotiations due to their private information about the target firm relative to outside bid-
ders without such a connection. Furthermore, institutional cross-owners may facilitate deals
with lower premium that could have been otherwise rejected by non cross-owners of targets.
Finally, higher institutional cross-ownership can reduce the probability of bidder competition
and target resistance. The negative relationship between institutional cross-ownership and
takeover premium is similar to Betton and Eckbo’s (2000) finding that toeholds are associated
with lower takeover premiums. Our result is also consistent with Harford et al. (2011) who find
that acquirers do not bid more aggressively in the deals with high cross-holdings.
To check the robustness of the takeover premium results, we follow Ishii and Xuan (2014)
and use target abnormal returns around the acquisition announcement as an alternative proxy
for takeover premiums. Compared to the takeover premium calculated by transaction value,
target CARs are adjusted for market returns and the market expectation of deal completion
probability. Columns (7)–(12) of Table 6 presents the OLS regression results. Using tar-
get three-day CARs as the dependent variable, we find negative and statistically significant
coefficients on all the institutional cross-ownership proxy variables. If acquirer institutional
cross-ownership (Ac CrossIO) increases by one standard deviation, target CARs will be re-
duced by 3.7%. The marginal effect of one more institutional top 10 cross-owner on target
CARs is −1.2%.
4.2.2 Institutional cross-ownership and M&A method of payment
Usually, the method of payment in M&A deals is acquirer stock, cash, or a combination
of the two. Exotic payment structures or option-like payment methods may also be included
in M&A deals, but they are not considered in this study. In Table 7, we test the relationship
between institutional cross-ownership and the percentage of stock payment involved in the
total value of the transaction, controlling for deal and firm characteristics, as well as year
and industry fixed effects. We employ Tobit regressions since the dependent variable – the
percentage of stock payment – is left-censored at zero.
The positive and significant coefficients on institutional cross-ownership proxy variables
17
show that greater institutional cross-ownership is on average associated with a higher fraction
of stock in deal payment.12 Increasing acquirer institutional cross-ownership (Ac CrossIO) by
one standard deviation raises stock payment by 9.9%. An increase of one institutional top 10
cross-owner will raise stock payment by 4.3% on average.
The results in Table 7 suggest that with more institutional cross-ownership, targets are
more likely to share the risk of merged companies, which is consistent with the explanation that
the existence of institutional cross-ownership reduces information asymmetry in merger deals.
From the perspective of target shareholders, the payment of acquirer stocks is more risky when
deal information asymmetry is high. When a target’s shareholders know that the M&A deal
is of good quality, they are willing to accept the stock of the new company and to ride on the
future growth opportunities. From the acquirer’s point of view, its institutional owners may be
reluctant to use stock to finance acquisitions because it will dilute their control of the acquirer.
This concern is mitigated if some institutional owners of acquirers are also the owners of targets,
especially when they hold a large percentage of target shares. Martin (1996) finds that the
likelihood of stock financing decreases with an acquirer’s higher institutional blockholdings.
Our results indicate that because institutional cross-owners and non cross-owners have different
objective functions in M&As, they may affect corporate decisions differently.
4.2.3 Institutional cross-ownership and deal completion probability
Next, we investigate whether deals with more institutional cross-owners have higher com-
pletion rates. On the one hand, institutional cross-owners may help facilitate deal negotiations
and have a positive effect on bid success. On the other hand, they may play a monitoring role
in deal negotiations, leading to a higher likelihood that deals of bad quality will be withdrawn.
To test these two possibilities, we separate our sample into one group of deals with positive
acquirer CARs and the other group with negative acquirer CARs. In columns (1)–(6) of Table
8, we run probit regressions of the M&A deal completion on the institutional cross-ownership
12Similarly, we investigate the relationship between institutional cross-ownership and the percentage of cash
payment involved in the total value of the transaction. Because stock and cash are substitutes as M&A methods
of payment, we find that cash is used less in deals with more institutional cross-ownership.
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proxy variables in the sub-sample of deals with negative CARs, controlling for deal charac-
teristics, firm characteristics, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. All coefficients on
the institutional cross-ownership proxy variables are negative and statistically significant, ex-
cept for Top5Count. Increasing acquirer institutional cross-ownership (Ac CrossIO) by one
standard deviation reduces the completion probability of negative CAR deals by 3.5%. The
marginal effect of one more institutional top 10 cross-owner is a 1.2% drop in the completion
probability of negative CAR deals.
In columns (7)–(12) of Table 8, we run probit regressions of M&A deal completion on the
institutional cross-ownership proxy variables for the sub-sample of deals with positive CARs,
controlling for deal characteristics, firm characteristics, industry fixed effects and year fixed
effects. The coefficients on the institutional cross-ownership proxy variables are positive but
not statistically significant, indicating that there is no effect of institutional cross-ownership on
deal completion for the positive CAR sub-sample. Overall, our findings in Table 8 support the
view that institutional cross-owners have a monitoring role in M&A deal negotiations, so that
deals with negative CARs will be more likely to be withdrawn.13
4.2.4 Institutional cross-ownership and transaction costs
Investment banks are generally hired by acquiring firms to identify potential deals with
high synergy, facilitate M&A transactions (McLaughlin, 1990, 1992) and provide professional
advice such as fairness opinions (Kisgen et al., 2009). Golubov et al. (2012) also find that for
deals with both public acquirers and targets, investment banks with a better reputation may
deliver higher acquirer announcement returns. If firms connected by institutional cross-owners
have greater information and better knowledge about deal long-term profitability, their need for
hiring investment banks to provide professional advice might be lower. Therefore, we predict
that M&A advisory fees are lower for deals with high institutional cross-ownership.
13In an untabulated test, we find that there is no significant relationship between institutional cross-ownership
and takeover success for all deals in our sample. This result is different from those of Jennings and Mazzeo
(1993) and Betton and Eckbo (2000), who find that toeholds are associated with a higher completion probability
of M&As. This difference further supports the monitoring role of institutional cross-owners, because compared
to institutional cross-ownership, toeholds are less likely to be related to corporate governance.
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Table 9 presents the results of OLS regressions for advisory fees. The M&A financial
advisory fees paid by acquirers and targets are collected from SDC. In columns (1)–(6) of Table
9, the dependent variable is the ratio of advisory fees paid by the acquirers to deal value. We find
that the existence of institutional cross-owners is associated with significantly lower advisory
fees paid by the acquirers. A one standard deviation increase in Ac CrossIO is associated
with 0.16% decrease in the percentage advisory fees paid by the acquirers. Given the average
deal value of $1,541 million in our sample, this translates to a $2.5 million reduction in fees
paid by acquirers. The marginal effect of one more top 10 institutional cross-owner is a 0.055%
decrease in the percentage advisory fees paid by the acquirers, equivalent to a $0.9 million
reduction. In columns (7)–(12) of Table 9, the dependent variable is the ratio of advisory fees
paid by the targets to deal value. Similarly, we find that targets pay lower advisory fees in
the presence of institutional cross-ownership. One more top 10 institutional cross-owner may
reduce the percentage advisory fees paid by the targets by 0.062%, translating to a $0.97 million
reduction.14 Our results are consistent with Cai and Sevilir (2012) who find that firms with
current board connections pay lower M&A financial advisory fees.
4.2.5 Institutional cross-ownership and earnings misreporting
Before the M&A announcement, both acquirers (Louis, 2004; Gong et al., 2008) and
targets (Anilowski et al., 2009) have an incentive to actively manage their earnings. But finan-
cial statement misreporting only benefits one side of the deal and creates greater uncertainty
in M&As. A deal with institutional cross-ownership may have less information asymmetry
because cross-owners have their feet on both sides of the deal. In addition, institutional cross-
owners may have a greater incentive to monitor both firms and reduce misreporting activities
ex ante, leading to more transparent financial information and more accurate bidding prices.
Following Bens et al. (2012) and Cai et al. (2016), we use the restatements of financial reports
by the newly merged firm as a proxy for misreporting and investigate whether the probability
14In untabulated tests, we also find a negative relationship between institutional cross-ownership and total
deal advisory fees paid by both acquirers and targets. Only 1, 703 deals in our sample have total advisory fee
data from SDC. The sample characteristics do not change significantly with the availability of total investment
banking fees.
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of a merging firm restating its earnings is negatively related to the institutional cross-ownership
between the acquirer and the target. The earnings restatement data are collected from Audit
Analytics. We eliminate all clerical application errors that are mainly due to unintentional
reporting mistakes (Bens et al., 2012). Similarly to Cai et al. (2016), we define the earnings
misreporting dummy to be equal to one if the beginning date of the misstatement period is
within a two-year window before the deal completion date and zero otherwise.15
Table 10 reports the coefficient estimates from the probit regressions of the earnings
misreporting dummy on the institutional cross-ownership measures. Because Audit Analytics
has only covered restatement data since 1996, the deal numbers drop to 1,497 with the sample
period of 1996–2014. We control for acquirer firm characteristics, target firm characteristics
and deal characteristics in all regressions. All the coefficients of institutional cross-ownership
measures are negative and statistically significant. The change in the probability of misreporting
decreases by 3.1% for one standard deviation increase in the market value weighted institutional
cross-ownership (Mvweighted CrossIO). The marginal effect of one more institutional top 10
cross-owner is a 1.3% drop in the probability of earnings restatements. The results in Table
10 suggest that the existence of institutional cross-ownership establishes an information bridge
between acquirers and targets, leading to reduced information asymmetry and deal uncertainty.
4.3 Institutional cross-ownership and M&A deal performance
Our results so far establish a positive relationship between institutional cross-ownership
and M&A deal probabilities. We also show that institutional cross-ownership affects deal
outcomes along several dimensions. To better understand the effect of cross-ownership on a
deal’s joint quality, we now examine the relationship between institutional cross-ownership and
M&A deal synergies, as well as post-merger long-term performance. It is worth noting that we
do not just focus on the value effect of institutional cross-owners on only one side of the deal
15We follow Cai et al. (2016) and choose a two-year time window. More than 95% of the completed deal
acquirers in our sample complete the deal within 365 days from the deal announcement. Therefore, the two-
year window covers both the fiscal year preceding the deal announcement and the fiscal year between deal
announcement and completion.
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because institutional cross-owners hold both acquirers and targets’ stocks.
4.3.1 Institutional cross-ownership and deal synergies
First, we proceed with the analysis of combined announcement returns as a proxy for
the total value creation. The dependent variable in the multivariate OLS analysis is synergy,
which is calculated as the firm market value weighted average of acquirer and target three-
day announcement CARs (e.g., Bradley et al., 1988; Harford et al., 2011). The independent
variable of interest is the number of institutional top 10 cross-owners. The previous literature
has identified a number of deal-related and acquirer-specific factors that have a significant effect
on deal announcement returns. We control for these variables in all our regressions, as well as
the year and industry fixed effects. p-values are calculated based on t-statistics adjusted for
heteroscedasticity. Column (1) of Panel A in Table 11 shows that synergy is positively related
to the number of top 10 institutional cross-owners and the coefficient is statistically significant.
The marginal effect of one more top 10 institutional cross-owner is a 2.0% increase in deal
synergies.
Previous studies on the role of institutional investors in M&As have documented that insti-
tutional investors can be classified into different types and each type may have a different effect
on M&A outcomes. Next, we follow Almazan et al. (2005) and Chen et al. (2007) and categorize
the top 10 institutional cross-owners into two groups: independent (Top10CountIndependent)
and grey (Top10CountGrey) institutional investors. The CDA/Spectrum classifies all institu-
tional investors into five types: (1) banks, (2) insurance companies, (3) investment companies,
(4) independent investment advisors and (5) others (e.g. pension fund, university endowment
and foundation).16 We define investment companies, independent investment advisors and pub-
lic pension funds as independent institutional investors. The remaining institutions are defined
as grey institutional investors. Columns (2) and (3) of Panel A in Table 11 show that the coef-
ficient of Top10CountIndependent is positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient
16We download the institutional investor type data from Professor Brian Bushee’s website: http://acct.
wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html. Professor Bushee and his research assistants assign a type
code on searches for information about the new fund manager after 1998.
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of Top10CountGrey is not statistically significant. These results are consistent with Almazan
et al. (2005) and Chen et al. (2007) that independent institutional investors are more likely to
play a monitoring role in corporate governance.
We also follow Bushee (1998) and Bushee and Noe (2000) to classify institutional cross-
owners into: non-transient (Top10CountDedicated/Quasi−index) and transient (Top10Count
Transient).17 Chen et al. (2007) document that dedicated and quasi-indexer investors play a
monitoring role in M&As. Appel et al. (2016) also find that passive mutual funds actually help
to remove firms’ takeover defenses and increase firms’ equal voting rights. Columns (4) and
(5) of Panel A in Table 11 show that the coefficient of Top10CountDedicated/Quasi − index
is positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient of Top10CountTransient is not
statistically significant. Our results are consistent with those documented in Chen et al. (2007)
and Appel et al. (2016).
4.3.2 Endogeneity between institutional cross-ownership and deal synergies
One concern on the relationship between cross-ownership and deal synergies is that insti-
tutional cross-owners could buy more shares of firms that tend to get involved in M&As and
are likely to have higher deal synergies. If that is the case, the better deal synergies we observe
would not be due to the influence of institutional cross-owners. To mitigate the endogeneity
issue related to reverse causality and omitted variables, we employ a two-stage least squares
(2SLS) approach with instrumental variables indicating the switch of firms between the Russell
1000 and the Russell 2000 indexes.
Firm switches between the two Russell indexes have been extensively used as an exogenous
shock on institutional ownership in the recent literature (e.g., Boone and White, 2015; Appel
et al., 2016; Bird and Karolyi, 2016; Khan et al., 2016). Chang et al. (2015) find that because
both the Russell 1000 and the Russell 2000 indexes are value-weighted, Russell index tracking
funds raise (reduce) their investment in firms that switch from the bottom (top) of the Russell
17These classifications are developed in Bushee (1998) and Bushee and Noe (2000). The following three
dimensions of investment patterns are used in the factor clustering analyses: portfolio turnover, diversification
and momentum trading.
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1000 (2000) to the top (bottom) of the Russell 2000 (1000). This exogenous shock on the own-
ership of Russell index tracking institutions may also lead to an ownership change among other
non-tracking institutions. Following Fich et al. (2015), Crane et al. (2016) and Schmidt and
Fahlenbrach (2017), we apply the regression discontinuity design approach and use the Russell
index switch indicator variables as instrumental variables in a two-stage least squares (2SLS)
estimation framework. The Russell index constituent data are downloaded from Bloomberg and
are available for the period 1995–2014. In the first stage regressions, we include the following
four instrumental variables: Acquirer Russell 1000t−1 → 2000t is an indicator variable equal to
one if the acquirer switches from the Russell 1000 to the Russell 2000; Acquirer Russell 2000t−1
→ 1000t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the acquirer switches from the Russell 2000 to
the Russell 1000; Target Russell 1000t−1 → 2000t is an indicator variable equal to one if the
target switches from the Russell 1000 to the Russell 2000; and Target Russell 2000t−1 → 1000t
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the target switches from the Russell 2000 to the Russell
1000. Among the 1, 867 sample deals announced during the period 1995–2014, 34 deal acquirers
switch from the Russell 1000 to the Russell 2000 before the deal announcement; 72 deal ac-
quirers switch from the Russell 2000 to the Russell 1000 before the deal announcement; 22 deal
targets switch from the Russell 1000 to the Russell 2000 before the deal announcement; and 31
deal targets switch from the Russell 2000 to the Russell 1000 before the deal announcement.
The three dependent variables in the first stage regressions are the changes in Top10Count,
Top10CountIndependent, and Top10CountDedicated/Quasi− index from t to t-1 before the
deal announcements. Following Fich et al. (2015), for deals announced in the fourth quarter
of year t, we calculate the institutional cross-owner variables at the end of the third quarter of
year t. For deals announced in the first three quarters of year t, we calculate the institutional
cross-owner variables at the end of the third quarter of year t-1. The three first stage regression
results are reported in Panel B of Table 11. According to the regression results, if an acquirer
switches from the Russell 1000 to the Russell 2000 before the deal announcement, there is a
significant decline in institutional cross-owner numbers.18
18This result is consistent with Fich et al. (2015).
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In the second stage regressions, we replace the three significant top 10 cross-owner vari-
ables in Panel A of Table 11 by the fitted value for the change in the corresponding variables
estimated in the first stage regressions. Panel B of Table 11 shows that the coefficients for the fit-
ted value of the change in Top10Count, Top10CountIndependent, and Top10CountDedicated/
Quasi − index are positive and statistically significant. Overall, the results reported in Table
11 suggest that institutional cross-owners have a positive effect on M&A deal synergies.
4.3.3 Institutional cross-ownership and deal long-run performance
As an alternative method to examine whether institutional cross-ownership leads to better
M&A performance, we further study the relationship between institutional cross-ownership and
the merged firm’s long-run performance. We focus on Top10Count, Top10CountIndependent,
and Top10CountDedicated/Quasi− index in our empirical analysis because these three cross-
ownership proxy variables have a positive and statistically significant impact on deal synergies.
In columns (1)–(3) of Table 12, the dependent variable is the change in acquirer abnormal
return on assets over a three-year time window after the deal announcement. In columns (4)–
(6) of Table 12, the dependent variable is the acquirer buy-and-hold abnormal stock return
over a three-year time window after the deal announcement. The estimated coefficients of
institutional cross-ownership proxy variables are all positive and statistically significant.19 The
results suggest that the impact of institutional cross-owners on M&As lasts for an extended
period after the deal announcement.
5 Discussion and robustness tests
5.1 Institutional cross-ownership asymmetry
Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) find that the total wealth change of institutional cross-
owners at the M&A announcement is close to zero and mutual fund cross-owners of acquirers
19In untabulated tests, we find that Top10CountGrey and Top10Transient do not have a significant impact
on the deal long-run performance.
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do vote for deals with negative announcement returns. However, Harford et al. (2011) argue
that institutional cross-ownership at the individual level is asymmetric and that the wealth
effect should not be simply added up. In this paper, we study whether the existence of cross-
owners affects deal probabilities and outcomes. Although the wealth change of institutional
cross-owners is not the focus of our paper, it is still possible that institutional cross-owners do
not have enough power to influence deals due to the cross-ownership asymmetry.
Previous cross-ownership studies usually apply an ownership threshold to address the
cross-ownership asymmetry concern. Chemmanur et al. (2016) find a positive relationship
between the number of common blockholders across two firms and the number of strategic
alliances between them. He and Huang (2017) find that common blockholders have an impact
on firms’ product market performance within the same industry. We examine the institu-
tional cross-owners who hold more than 1% of acquirer and target’s stocks in our deal sample:
Ac CrossIO 1% and Ta CrossIO 1%. These institutional investors have relatively symmetric
and large holdings in both acquirers and targets. The maximum number of these institutional
cross-owners is 20, the minimum is zero and the average is 2.5. We find that the estimated
coefficients of Ac CrossIO 1% and Ta CrossIO 1% are statistically significant in all the previ-
ously reported tables.20 He et al. (2017) adopt a peers’ market value weighted cross-ownership
measure and find that this measure is positively related to the likelihood that an institution
votes against management in shareholder-sponsored governance proposals. Our cross-ownership
proxy variable, Mvweighted CrossIO, shares the similar intuition with He et al.’s (2017) mea-
sure. Furthermore, we use Top5/10/20Count to measure the number of cross-owners who are
influential in both acquirer and target. Overall, our evidence suggests that institutional cross-
owners have a significant impact on M&A transactions after controlling for the cross-ownership
asymmetry.
20In untabulated tests, we further study common blockholder ownership between acquirers and targets and
find qualitatively the same results.
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5.2 Institutional cross-ownership vs. institutional ownership
Institutional investors play a monitoring role in the corporate governance literature. It
is possible that institutional cross-ownership is positively correlated with acquirer or target
institutional ownership which could independently affect M&A outcomes. To rule out this
alternative explanation, we control for acquirer or target institutional ownership in all our
regressions if appropriate. Our results suggest that the relationship between institutional cross-
ownership and M&A deal outcomes holds after controlling for firm institutional ownership.
Interestingly, we find some weak evidence that institutional ownership is positively and
significantly related to the takeover premium in Table 6, which is the opposite to institutional
cross-ownership. Similarly, we find weak evidence that institutional ownership is negatively
and significantly related to the percentage of stock payment in Table 7, which is the opposite
to institutional cross-ownership. Furthermore, we find that institutional ownership itself does
not affect deal completion probability in Table 8. Index investing may cause an increase in
both institutional ownership and cross-ownership.21 Unobserved firm characteristics may also
be related to these two ownership measures. However, our results indicate that institutional
cross-owners, as a subset of institutional investors, play a different role in M&As.22 This finding
mitigates the potential concern that the empirical relation between cross-ownership and deal
outcomes is spurious due to the growth of index investment and unobserved firm characteristics.
5.3 Institutional cross-ownership and other deal characteristics
Many previous studies document a diversification discount (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1994;
Berger and Ofek, 1995; Servaes, 1996; Santos et al., 2008). Morck et al. (1990) also find
that diversifying deals have a negative effect on acquirer announcement returns. We use deal
diversification as a proxy for deal quality. We separate our sample into a diversifying deal sample
21Recent studies find that index funds or passive institutional investors can improve corporate governance as
well (e.g., Appel et al., 2016; He et al., 2017).
22We check the variance inflation factors (VIF) of institutional cross-ownership variables and institutional
ownership variable in our regressions. All VIF values are less than four, which is lower than the standard
collinearity tolerance level of 10.
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and a non-diversifying deal sample. In untabulated univariate tests, we find that the means of
institutional cross-ownership proxy variables are significantly higher for non-diversifying deals
than for diversifying deals. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test confirms that the medians of the
institutional cross-ownership proxy variables for non-diversifying deals are higher than those of
diversifying deals. These results suggest that deals with high institutional cross-ownership are
more likely to be non-diversifying.
Our findings that institutional cross-owners may facilitate deal negotiation and increase
the bargaining power of acquirers would imply a positive relationship between institutional
cross-ownership and the number of bids for the target. 10% of our sample deals have more
than one bidder on the deal announcement. In untabulated results, we find that the presence
of institutional cross-owners is positively associated with the number of deal bidders, controlling
for year and industry fixed effects.
5.4 Mechanisms through which cross-owners affect M&As
The most direct way that institutional cross-owners may influence corporate activities is
through shareholder voting. He et al. (2017) document a positive relation between an institu-
tional investor’s cross-holdings in peer firms and the probability that the investor votes against
management in shareholder-sponsored governance proposals. With regard to M&As, Matvos
and Ostrovsky (2008) find that mutual fund cross-owners are more likely to vote for a merger
with negative acquirer announcement returns than mutual fund non-cross-owners. In addition,
previous corporate governance studies tend to agree that some certain types of institutional
investors monitor firm managers and improve firm governance (e.g. Bushee, 1998; Chen et al.,
2007). In Table 11, we find that independent and dedicated cross-owners improve deal syn-
ergies while grey and transient cross-owners do not, which further lends support to the view
that institutional cross-owners have an impact on M&As through monitoring the management
teams of acquirers and targets.
Another possible channel is that institutional cross-owners may mitigate deal informa-
tion asymmetry because they have their feet on both acquirers and targets. He and Huang
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(2017) show that cross-owners can reduce information asymmetry among peer firms in the
same industry and facilitate the collaboration between two cross-held peer firms. To verify the
information asymmetry channel, we further examine the impact of targets’ asymmetric infor-
mation on the relation between cross-owners and deal performance. We conduct sub-sample
analyses so that the coefficients may have a more nuanced interpretation. Specifically, we di-
vide our M&A sample into two sub-samples based on the medians of the numbers of financial
analysts following, Analyst. A lower value of Analyst indicates a higher level of informa-
tion asymmetry (e.g., Hong et al., 2000; Chen et al., 2015). Table 13 presents the relation
between cross-ownership and deal performance in above- and below-median analyst coverage
sub-samples. The deal performance measures are Synergy, ∆AROA 3Y , and BHAR 3Y . In
Panel A–C, the explanatory variables of interest are Top10Count, Top10CountIndependent,
and Top10CountDedicated/Quasi− index, respectively23. The estimated coefficients of three
cross-ownership variables are positive and statistically significant in the below-median analyst
coverage sub-samples, while the impact of cross-owners on deal performance is not statisti-
cally significant in the above-median analyst coverage sub-samples. Our results confirm that
institutional cross-owners improve deal quality through mitigating information asymmetry.
6 Conclusions
Institutional investors have been demonstrated to play an important role in the financial
markets and have an impact on a variety of corporate strategies. But few studies have shown
how institutional investors affect firms’ acquisition behavior and performance. We investigate
the impact of institutional cross-ownership, where the same set of institutional investors has
significant stakes in both acquirers and targets, on various aspects of deal outcomes in M&As.
Two types of institutional cross-ownership measures are studied in our empirical analysis: the
percentage of shareholdings and the number of cross-owners.
We first show that institutional cross-ownership between two firms increases the likelihood
23We omit the regression results for grey and transient cross-owners as their impact is not statistically signif-
icant.
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of them merging. Then we show that institutional cross-ownership affects various deal charac-
teristics and performance. We find that institutional cross-ownership reduces deal premiums,
thus leading to better value for acquirers. Deals with high institutional cross-ownership tend to
involve more stock as the method of payment. Cross-ownership diminishes the likelihood of bad
deal completion, enhances deal synergies and is positively related to the long-run performance
of the merged entities from both fundamental (operating) and stock market perspectives. We
also find a negative relationship between institutional cross-ownership and deal transaction
costs. Institutional cross-owners help reduce deal uncertainty by limiting earnings misreport-
ing. Our results suggest that institutional cross-owners benefit acquirers by providing them
with an information advantage about the true value of the target firm and more bargaining
power in deal negotiations. Besides the positive effect of institutional cross-ownership on deal
outcomes, we also document a positive relationship between cross-ownership and total deal per-
formance, measured by the deal synergy and long-run performance. Overall we conclude that
cross-ownership improves the quality of mergers, a finding which we attribute to the superior
two-sided information, better monitoring role and stronger negotiating power of such investors
compared with those who operate only on one side of the deal.
Our work contributes to the literature on the effect of institutional investors on corporate
activities. More specifically, we demonstrate the impact of cross-firm institutional ownership in
the context of mergers and acquisitions. The evidence presented in our paper is consistent with
the view that different interests among shareholder groups within a firm have externalities for
firm performance. We also contribute to a growing literature on the effect of firm connections
in the business world. Hence the rise of institutional cross-holdings in U.S. stock markets
has a significant effect on corporate strategies and decision-making processes. Following on
from our study, two promising extensions exist for future research. Firstly, to examine the
trading activities of institutional cross-owners before and after M&As and in particular to
investigate whether cross-owners are able to use their two-sided information to earn higher
returns. Secondly, to investigate the impact of institutional cross-ownership on other corporate
strategies and policies.
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Highlights
• Cross-ownership increases the likelihood of two firms merging together.
• Cross-owners have a significant impact on M&A deal characteristics.
• Cross-ownership is positively associated with deal performance.
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Appendix A
Table A1: Variable definitions
This table provides variable definitions and the corresponding data sources. CRSP refers to the
Center for Research in Security Prices, FF refers to Kenneth French’s website at Dartmouth,
SDC refers to the Thomson Reuters Securities Data Company, 13F refers to the Thomson
Reuters 13F Database, and IBES refers to the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System.
Variable Definition Source
Dependent variables of interest
Premium (transaction value/market value of target) − 1 SDC/CRSP
Percent of stock The percentage of stock payment involved in the total
value of the transaction
SDC
Ac(Ta) CAR3 Cumulative abnormal returns on acquirer (target) stocks
over the event window (-1, 1), using the market model with
the CRSP value-weighted index as the benchmark. The
model is estimated using at least 30 non-missing daily
returns over the (-300, -91).
CRSP
Completion Indicator variable: one for deals that are completed, zero
for withdrawn deals.
SDC
Ac(Ta) fees Investment banking fees paid by acquirers (targets) SDC
Restatement Indicator variable: one for merging firms that restate
earnings within a two-year window before deal completion,
zero otherwise.
Audit Analytics
Synergy (acquirer CAR3 ∗ acquirer market value + target CAR3 ∗
(1-toehold)*target market value)/ (acquirer market value
+ (1-toehold)∗ target market value).
CRSP/SDC
AROA Acquirer abnormal return on asset with the benchmark
being the median return on asset of a group of Compustat
firms with the same industry (2-digit SIC code), similar
size (±30% of book value of asset) and similar operating
performance (±10% ROA) in the fiscal year preceding the
deal announcement.
Compustat
BHAR Acquirer buy-and-hold abnormal stock return with the
benchmark being the return of a control firm stock in the
same industry (2-digit SIC code), of similar size (±30%),
and with the nearest book-to-market ratio.
Compustat/CRSP
/FF
Acquirer and target firm characteristics
Size The natural log of total assets at the end of the fiscal year
before the announcement.
Compustat
B/M Book value of assets over market value of assets at the end
of the fiscal year before the deal announcement.
Compustat
Leverage Book value of debt over total assets at the end of the fiscal
year before the deal announcement
Compustat
Continued on next page
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Table A1 – continued from previous page
Variable Definition Source
Cashholding Cash holdings, including cash and marketable securities,
normalized by total assets.
Compustat
CF/Equity Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation minus
dividends on common and preferred stocks divided by firm
market value at the end of the fiscal year before the deal
announcement
Compustat
Runup Market adjusted buy-and-hold stock return over the (-205,
-6) window (Golubov et al., 2012).
CRSP
Sigma The standard deviation of the market-adjusted daily return
over the (-205, -6) window (Golubov et al., 2012).
CRSP
Collateral The value of the property, plant, and equipment over total
assets at the end of the fiscal year before the deal
announcement
Compustat
IO Institutional ownership at the quarter end. 13F
ROA Operating cash flows over total assets. Compustat
Sales Growth Percentage change in sales from the previous year. Compustat
Analyst The number of analysts following targets IBES
Deal characteristics
Pure Cash Indicator variable: one for deals financed fully with cash,
zero otherwise.
SDC
Pure Stock Indicator variable: one for deals financed fully with stock,
zero otherwise.
SDC
Toehold Indicator variable: one if the acquirer already holds a
certain percentage of the target shares at the
announcement, zero otherwise.
SDC
Hostile Indicator variable: one for hostile deals, zero otherwise. SDC
Tender Offer Indicator variable: one for tender offers, zero otherwise. SDC
Diversifying Indicator variable: one if the target and acquirer have
different two-digit SIC Codes, zero otherwise
SDC
Competition Indicator variable: one if more than one firm is bidding for
the target, zero otherwise
SDC
Relative Size The ratio of transaction value to acquirer market value at
the end of the fiscal year before the deal announcement.
SDC/Compustat
Institutional cross-ownership variables
Ac(Ta) CrossIO Ownership by acquirer (target) institutions that own target
(acquirer) shares.
13F
Ac(Ta) CrossIO 1% Ownership by acquirer (target) institutions that own target
(acquirer) shares, with a 1% threshold restriction on
acquirer and target institutional ownership.
13F
Mvweighted CrossIO Ac CrossIO∗acquirer market value/(acquirer market value
+ target market value) + Ta CrossIO∗target market
value/(acquirer market value + target market value)
13F/Compustat
Top5/10/20Count Number of institutions that are within both acquirer’s and
target’s top 5/10/20 largest institutional owners.
13F
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Table 1: Sample distribution
Panel A. Distribution of M&As by year. This panel presents the sample distribution of completed
and withdrawn U.S. M&A deals between 1984 and 2014 by announcement year. Both the acquirers
and the targets are public firms with complete information in the CRSP and Compustat databases.
We also require that both the acquirers and the targets have institutional ownership information from
the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13F) database.
Year Deal number Percent Year Deal number Percent
1984 41 1.57 2000 152 5.84
1985 51 1.96 2001 128 4.92
1986 63 2.42 2002 56 2.15
1987 55 2.11 2003 96 3.69
1988 59 2.27 2004 95 3.65
1989 48 1.84 2005 84 3.23
1990 29 1.11 2006 88 3.38
1991 38 1.46 2007 87 3.34
1992 30 1.15 2008 69 2.65
1993 68 2.61 2009 49 1.88
1994 109 4.19 2010 59 2.27
1995 134 5.15 2011 43 1.65
1996 145 5.57 2012 55 2.11
1997 200 7.68 2013 60 2.3
1998 174 6.68 2014 59 2.27
1999 180 6.91 Total 2,604 100
Panel B. Distribution of M&As by industry. This panel presents the sample distribution of
completed and withdrawn U.S. M&A deals between 1984 and 2014 by acquirer industry. We assign
acquirers into the Fama–French 10 industries based on acquirer SIC codes. Both the acquirers and
the targets are public firms with complete information in the CRSP and Compustat databases. We
also require that both the acquirers and the targets have institutional ownership information the from
Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13F) database.
Fama–French 10 industries Frequency Percent
Consumer nondurables 977 37.52
Consumer durables 549 21.08
Manufacturing 280 10.75
Oil, gas and coal extraction and production 216 8.29
Business equipment 167 6.41
Telephone and television transmission 105 4.03
Wholesale, retail and some services 96 3.69
Healthcare, medical equipment and drug 90 3.46
Utilities 73 2.80
Other – mines, Constr, bldmt, trans, etc. 51 1.96
Total 2,604 100
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics of the variables for 2,604 M&A deals in our sample. The
sample period is between 1984 and 2014. Both the acquirer and the target are public firms with
complete information in CRSP and Compustat. We also require that both the acquirer and the
target have institutional ownership information from the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum
Institutional (13F) database. The number of observations, mean, standard deviation, 25th
percentile, median and 75th percentile are reported from left to right in sequence for each
variable. Detailed definitions of all variables can be found in Appendix A.
Panel A. Deal outcome and performance-related variables
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. p25 p50 p75
Ac CAR3 2,588 -0.02 0.08 -0.05 -0.01 0.02
Ta CAR3 2,590 0.20 0.22 0.06 0.17 0.30
Premium 2,602 0.79 2.29 0.24 0.47 0.85
Percent of stock 2,604 53.70 44.20 0 60.60 100
Completion 2,604 0.82 0.38 1 1 1
Ac fees 777 0.66% 0.67% 0.26% 0.48% 0.82%
Ta fees 1,636 0.89% 0.80% 0.40% 0.77% 1.14%
Restatement 1,879 0.07 0.26 0 0 0
Synergy 2,554 0.04 0.81 -0.02 0.02 0.06
AROA 3Y 1,777 -0.43% 14.29% -2.71% -0.04% 2.00%
BHAR 3Y 2,148 -0.30% 4.38% -1.87% -0.23% 1.36%
Panel B. Institutional cross-ownership proxy variables
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. p25 p50 p75
Ac CrossIO 2,604 0.18 0.18 0.04 0.12 0.30
Ac CrossIO 1% 2,604 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.12
Ta CrossIO 2,604 0.21 0.20 0.05 0.14 0.33
Ta CrossIO 1% 2,604 0.08 0.10 0.01 0.05 0.13
Mvweighted CrossIO 2,604 0.19 0.18 0.04 0.13 0.30
Top5Count 2,604 0.83 0.90 0 1 1
Top10Count 2,604 2.06 1.51 1 2 3
Top20Count 2,604 4.59 2.73 3 4 6
Top10CountIndependent 2,604 1.17 1.14 0 1 2
Top10CountGrey 2,604 0.89 0.99 0 1 1
Top10CountDedicated/Quasi-index 2,604 1.77 1.41 1 2 3
Top10CountTransient 2,604 0.24 0.56 0 0 0
40
Panel C. Deal and firm characteristic variables
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. p25 p50 p75
Deal characteristics
Pure Cash 2,604 0.24 0.42 0 0 0
Pure Stock 2,604 0.39 0.49 0 0 1
Toehold 2,604 0.06 0.24 0 0 0
Hostile 2,604 0.05 0.22 0 0 0
Tender Offer 2,604 0.16 0.37 0 0 0
Diversifying 2,604 0.3 0.46 0 0 1
Competition 2,604 0.1 0.29 0 0 0
Relative Size 2,604 0.62 1.29 0.14 0.32 0.69
Acquirer firm characteristics
IO 2,604 0.51 0.27 0.30 0.51 0.73
Size 2,595 7.18 1.98 5.82 7.19 8.50
B/M 2,560 2.05 3.38 1.06 1.31 2.00
Leverage 2,595 58.92 26.99 38.35 58.12 85.79
Cashholding 2,592 0.15 0.18 0.03 0.07 0.20
CF/Equity 2,594 0.05 0.27 0.03 0.06 0.10
Runup 2,601 1.15 0.51 0.90 1.08 1.27
Sigma 2,601 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03
Collateral 2,517 0.21 0.23 0.02 0.13 0.33
ROA 2,601 0.10 0.14 0.03 0.10 0.16
Sales Growth 2,596 0.29 0.87 0.02 0.13 0.31
Target firm characteristics
IO 2,604 0.39 0.28 0.15 0.34 0.61
Size 2,601 5.23 1.77 3.94 5.08 6.44
Leverage 2,563 58.48 29.56 34.71 57.66 85.97
B/M 2,503 1.76 2.09 1.02 1.20 1.76
Cashholding 2,555 0.16 0.20 0.02 0.06 0.22
ROA 2,339 0.20 0.65 -0.01 0.10 0.23
Sales Growth 2,437 0.06 0.19 0.02 0.08 0.15
Runup 2,595 1.12 1.48 0.82 1.04 1.29
Sigma 2,595 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
41
Table 3: Probability of acquisition and institutional cross-ownership: Univariate tests
This table examines whether an M&A deal is more likely to occur between two firms that have a high
institutional cross-ownership. Panel A reports the average institutional cross-ownership measures
between sample acquirers and random targets, which we construct by pairing each sample acquirer
with a random firm drawn from the sample target’s industry in the deal announcement year. We
restrict the relative size between the random target and sample acquirer to be above 5%. Following this
procedure, we bootstrap 500 random targets. Panel B reports the average institutional cross-ownership
measures between random acquirers and sample targets, which we construct by pairing each sample
target with a random firm drawn from the sample acquirer’s industry in the deal announcement year.
We restrict the relative size between the sample target and random acquirer to be above 5%. Following
this procedure, we bootstrap 500 random acquirers. Panel C reports the average institutional cross-
ownership measures between random acquirers and random targets, which we construct by drawing
one random firm from the sample acquirer’s industry and one random firm from the sample target’s
industry in the deal announcement year for each acquisition in our sample. We restrict the relative
size between the random target and random acquirer to be above 5%. We repeat the procedure
500 times. All institutional cross-ownership measures are calculated at the quarter end before the
deal announcement. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
Panel A. Sample acquirers and random targets
Real sample Simulated sample Difference
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Real−simulated
Ac CrossIO 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.01**
Ac CrossIO 1% 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.02***
Mvweighted CrossIO 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.02***
Top5Count 0.83 0.90 0.58 0.41 0.25***
Top10Count 2.07 1.51 1.58 0.78 0.49***
Top20Count 4.59 2.73 3.78 1.54 0.81***
Panel B. Random acquirers and sample targets
Real sample Simulated sample Difference
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Real−simulated
Ta CrossIO 0.21 0.21 0.11 0.11 0.10***
Ta CrossIO 1% 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.03***
Mvweighted CrossIO 0.19 0.18 0.11 0.10 0.08***
Top5Count 0.83 0.90 0.51 0.35 0.32***
Top10Count 2.07 1.51 1.36 0.68 0.71***
Top20Count 4.59 2.73 3.03 1.42 1.56***
Panel C. Random acquirers and random targets
Real sample Simulated sample Difference
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Real−simulated
Ac CrossIO 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.06 0.09***
Ac CrossIO 1% 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.03***
Ta CrossIO 0.21 0.20 0.09 0.06 0.12***
Ta CrossIO 1% 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.04***
Mvweighted CrossIO 0.19 0.18 0.09 0.06 0.10***
Top5Count 0.83 0.90 0.46 0.19 0.37***
Top10Count 2.07 1.51 1.20 0.41 0.87***
Top20Count 4.59 2.73 2.64 0.90 1.95***
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Table 4: Probability of firms being acquirers and institutional cross-ownership
This table reports the coefficient estimates from conditional logit models. The dependent
variable is equal to one for the sample acquirer and zero for the matched acquirers in the
control group. The matched acquirers are firms in the sample acquirer’s industry (Fama–
French 10 industries), of similar size (within a 20% band of market capitalization) and of
similar B/M ratio (within a 20% band of B/M). The relative size between the sample target
and matched acquirers is above 5%. Detailed definitions of acquirer control variables can be
found in Appendix A. Deal fixed effects are controlled for in all regressions. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the deal level. p-values are reported in parentheses. Significance at the
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels is indicated by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Ac CrossIO 3.565***
(0.000)
Ac CrossIO 1% 8.912***
(0.000)
Mvweighted CrossIO 6.867***
(0.000)
Top5Count 0.583***
(0.000)
Top10Count 0.403***
(0.000)
Top20Count 0.283***
(0.000)
IO 0.683*** 1.663*** 1.111*** 0.334*** 0.305*** 0.229**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.007) (0.047)
Size 1.925*** 1.825*** 1.995*** 1.940*** 1.982*** 1.967***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
B/M 1.008*** 0.930*** 1.022*** 1.023*** 1.042*** 1.053***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
ROA -0.682*** -0.767*** -0.631** -0.656** -0.601** -0.538**
(0.009) (0.005) (0.016) (0.015) (0.027) (0.046)
Cashholding -0.119 0.013 -0.086 -0.047 -0.034 -0.046
(0.541) (0.945) (0.657) (0.808) (0.863) (0.814)
Sales Growth 0.000 -0.008* 0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001
(0.931) (0.079) (0.785) (0.345) (0.548) (0.733)
Runup 0.284*** 0.299*** 0.266*** 0.281*** 0.286*** 0.295***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sigma -25.615*** -26.664*** -24.916*** -25.671*** -25.351*** -25.013***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Deal fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 36,944 36,944 36,944 36,944 36,944 36,944
Actual acquirer No. 2,177 2,177 2,177 2,177 2,177 2,177
Control acquirer No. 34,767 34,767 34,767 34,767 34,767 34,767
Pseudo R-squared 0.045 0.080 0.067 0.058 0.065 0.074
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Table 5: Probability of firms being targets and institutional cross-ownership
This table reports the coefficient estimates from conditional logit models. The dependent
variable is equal to one for the sample target and zero for the matched targets in the control
group. The matched targets are the firms in the sample target’s industry (Fama–French 10
industries), of similar size (within a 20% band of market capitalization) and of similar B/M
ratio (within a 20% band of B/M). The relative size between the matched targets and sample
acquirers is above 5%. Detailed definitions of target control variables can be found in Appendix
A. Deal fixed effects are controlled for in all regressions. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the deal level. p-values are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10
levels is indicated by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Ta CrossIO 3.926***
(0.000)
Ta CrossIO 1% 10.063***
(0.000)
Mvweighted CrossIO 7.387***
(0.000)
Top5Count 0.523***
(0.000)
Top10Count 0.345***
(0.000)
Top20Count 0.219***
(0.000)
IO 1.346*** 2.845*** 1.155*** 0.429*** 0.315*** 0.087
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.455)
Size 1.652*** 1.598*** 1.463*** 1.567*** 1.554*** 1.508***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
B/M 0.623*** 0.664*** 0.517*** 0.581*** 0.595*** 0.561***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA -0.308 -0.180 -0.258 -0.267 -0.170 -0.099
(0.139) (0.401) (0.217) (0.201) (0.422) (0.632)
Cashholding 0.051 0.043 0.006 0.046 0.032 0.066
(0.752) (0.793) (0.973) (0.782) (0.844) (0.685)
Sales Growth -0.019*** -0.013* -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.017**
(0.009) (0.088) (0.006) (0.009) (0.003) (0.011)
Runup 0.051** 0.040 0.047** 0.053** 0.055** 0.057*
(0.035) (0.102) (0.049) (0.025) (0.047) (0.070)
Sigma -10.680*** -11.425*** -10.988*** -9.921*** -9.734*** -9.759***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Deal fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 44,388 44,388 44,388 44,388 44,388 44,388
Actual target No. 2,145 2,145 2,145 2,145 2,145 2,145
Control target No. 42,243 42,243 42,243 42,243 42,243 42,243
Pseudo R-squared 0.040 0.105 0.056 0.045 0.049 0.051
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Table 7: Institutional cross-ownership and method of payments
This table presents the Tobit regression results of the acquirer method of payment on the
institutional cross-ownership proxy variables. Our sample consists of 2,604 M&A deals between
1984 and 2014 in which both acquirers and targets are U.S. public firms. The dependent
variable is the percentage of stock defined as the percentage of stock payment involved in the
total value of the transaction as reported by the Securities Data Company database. The
Tobit regression adjusts for the left-censoring of observations at 0. Detailed definitions of
the independent variables are given in Appendix A. Year and Fama–French 10 industry fixed
effects are controlled for in all regressions. Robust standard errors are estimated and p-values
are reported in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Ac CrossIO 54.753***
(0.000)
Ac CrossIO 1% 72.634***
(0.000)
Mvweighted CrossIO 53.189***
(0.000)
Top5Count 5.396***
(0.000)
Top10Count 4.346***
(0.000)
Top20Count 3.244***
(0.000)
IO -20.970*** -15.453*** -19.456*** -1.356 -0.679 -3.924
(0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.796) (0.897) (0.448)
Size 1.546* 3.061*** 1.486 3.004*** 2.339*** 1.227
(0.087) (0.000) (0.105) (0.000) (0.005) (0.163)
B/M 0.650* 0.707* 0.639* 0.730* 0.715* 0.636*
(0.059) (0.060) (0.062) (0.054) (0.061) (0.069)
Leverage 0.091 0.067 0.093 0.058 0.069 0.090
(0.142) (0.279) (0.133) (0.347) (0.265) (0.141)
Cashholding 8.561 10.164 9.183 9.860 8.172 5.282
(0.278) (0.201) (0.245) (0.216) (0.303) (0.504)
CF/Equity -9.231** -8.716** -9.269** -9.098** -8.706** -7.860**
(0.021) (0.029) (0.020) (0.029) (0.037) (0.044)
Runup 8.400*** 8.639*** 8.387*** 8.609*** 8.742*** 9.017***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sigma 635.200*** 659.176*** 634.729*** 660.403*** 662.962*** 658.333***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Collateral -20.031*** -18.605*** -20.607*** -18.524*** -19.563*** -20.912***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.003)
Toehold -15.385** -15.072** -15.113** -15.312** -15.365** -15.624**
(0.021) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018)
Hostile -13.177* -12.581 -13.340* -11.079 -11.653 -12.408
(0.089) (0.110) (0.086) (0.164) (0.138) (0.115)
Tender Offer -80.409*** -80.620*** -80.533*** -80.724*** -80.502*** -79.719***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Diversifying -4.346* -4.250* -4.336* -3.925 -3.815 -3.606
(0.090) (0.098) (0.091) (0.127) (0.136) (0.157)
Competition -6.608 -5.897 -6.652 -4.954 -5.720 -6.534
(0.166) (0.218) (0.164) (0.304) (0.233) (0.171)
Premium -1.810* -1.935** -1.814* -1.989** -1.853* -1.753*
(0.056) (0.044) (0.057) (0.041) (0.060) (0.067)
Relative Size -2.300 -1.808 -2.197 -1.524 -1.798 -2.232
(0.118) (0.168) (0.140) (0.209) (0.174) (0.124)
Intercept 31.350** 8.956 30.818** 3.152 3.863 10.034
(0.010) (0.433) (0.012) (0.782) (0.734) (0.381)
Industry & Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,478 2,478 2,478 2,478 2,478 2,478
Pseudo R-squared 0.064 0.063 0.064 0.063 0.064 0.065
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Table 10: Institutional cross-ownership and earnings restatement
This table presents the coefficient estimates (marginal effects reported) from probit regressions of earnings
misreporting. Only completed M&A deals are included in these regressions. The dependent variable is equal
to one if the beginning date of the misstatement period falls within a two-year window before the merger
completion and zero otherwise. We control for acquirer, target, and deal characteristics. Detailed definitions
of the independent variables can be found in Appendix A. Year and Fama–French 10 industry fixed effects are
controlled for in all regressions. Robust standard errors are clustered at the deal level. p-values are reported in
parentheses. Significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels is indicated by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Ac CrossIO -0.132*
(0.066)
Ac CrossIO 1% -0.251**
(0.022)
Ta CrossIO -0.141**
(0.034)
Ta CrossIO 1% -0.331***
(0.002)
Mvweighted CrossIO -0.174**
(0.019)
Top5Count -0.028***
(0.001)
Top10Count -0.013**
(0.012)
Top20Count -0.008***
(0.009)
IO 0.093** 0.095*** 0.065* 0.088*** 0.096** 0.046 0.048 0.052
(0.016) (0.007) (0.055) (0.010) (0.011) (0.175) (0.155) (0.124)
Size -0.005 -0.015 -0.000 -0.014 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006
(0.622) (0.156) (0.981) (0.150) (0.614) (0.564) (0.608) (0.563)
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.811) (0.575) (0.790) (0.576) (0.810) (0.868) (0.814) (0.810)
B/M -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004
(0.078) (0.083) (0.095) (0.097) (0.072) (0.076) (0.078) (0.101)
Runup 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.035***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Sigma 0.913 0.851 0.898 0.838 0.898 0.845 0.854 0.861
(0.201) (0.250) (0.207) (0.254) (0.208) (0.235) (0.226) (0.220)
Pure Stock 0.019 0.027* 0.021 0.028* 0.020 0.022 0.020 0.020
(0.218) (0.093) (0.177) (0.075) (0.199) (0.160) (0.205) (0.211)
Toehold -0.028 -0.029 -0.027 -0.027 -0.029 -0.019 -0.025 -0.027
(0.585) (0.572) (0.603) (0.603) (0.574) (0.710) (0.624) (0.598)
Hostile 0.053 0.047 0.051 0.048 0.053 0.043 0.051 0.050
(0.399) (0.457) (0.424) (0.443) (0.399) (0.500) (0.423) (0.437)
Tender Offer -0.025 -0.030 -0.027 -0.028 -0.025 -0.023 -0.024 -0.025
(0.255) (0.182) (0.225) (0.212) (0.251) (0.279) (0.272) (0.241)
Diversifying -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.014 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013
(0.471) (0.435) (0.463) (0.377) (0.468) (0.411) (0.438) (0.404)
Competition 0.031 0.038 0.032 0.035 0.031 0.027 0.030 0.030
(0.309) (0.220) (0.307) (0.263) (0.309) (0.380) (0.337) (0.336)
Premium -0.001 0.012*** -0.000 0.012*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.862) (0.001) (0.959) (0.001) (0.915) (0.860) (0.817) (0.933)
Relative Size -0.015 -0.024 -0.013 -0.023 -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 -0.016
(0.342) (0.152) (0.376) (0.156) (0.322) (0.335) (0.323) (0.297)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,542 1,542 1,542 1,542 1,542 1,542 1,542 1,542
Pseudo R-squared 0.088 0.090 0.089 0.089 0.097 0.096 0.092 0.092
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Table 11: Institutional cross-ownership and deal synergies
Panel A. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. This panel presents the OLS re-
gression results of the deal synergies on the institutional cross-ownership proxy variables. Our
sample consists of 2,604 M&A deals between 1984 and 2014 in which both acquirers and targets
are U.S. public firms. Following Bradley et al. (1988) and Harford et al. (2011), the dependent
variable Synergies percent is calculated as: (acquirer CAR3 ∗ acquirer market value + target
CAR3 ∗ (1-toehold)∗target market value)/ (acquirer market value + (1-toehold)*target market
value). The primary explanatory variables of interest are the number of top 10 institutional
cross-ownership proxy variables. In columns (2) and (3), we divide the top 10 institutional cross-
owners into independent institutional investors and grey institutional investors. In columns (4)
and (5), we divide the top 10 institutional cross-owners into dedicated/quasi-index institutional
investors and transient institutional investors. Detailed definitions of the control variables are
given in Appendix A. Year and Fama–French 10 industry fixed effects are controlled for in
all regressions. Regression standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980).
p-values are reported in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively.
1 2 3 4 5
Top10Count 0.020*
(0.059)
Top10CountIndependent 0.029**
(0.038)
Top10CountGrey 0.009
(0.560)
Top10CountDedicated/Quasi-index 0.025**
(0.028)
Top10CountTransient -0.008
(0.766)
IO -0.011 -0.031 -0.019 -0.002 -0.026
(0.881) (0.654) (0.792) (0.975) (0.708)
Size 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.009
(0.740) (0.545) (0.517) (0.793) (0.396)
B/M -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.898) (0.873) (0.921) (0.943) (0.932)
Leverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.592) (0.601) (0.680) (0.614) (0.718)
Cashholding -0.062 -0.055 -0.063 -0.065 -0.061
(0.543) (0.590) (0.539) (0.528) (0.550)
CF/Equity 0.018 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.019
(0.751) (0.727) (0.742) (0.755) (0.733)
Runup -0.036 -0.039 -0.034 -0.033 -0.035
(0.255) (0.211) (0.272) (0.286) (0.269)
Sigma 1.196 1.129 1.178 1.208 1.153
(0.418) (0.445) (0.426) (0.413) (0.436)
Pure Cash 0.080* 0.080** 0.075* 0.079* 0.074*
Continued on next page
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Table 11 Panel A – continued from previous page
1 2 3 4 5
(0.050) (0.050) (0.064) (0.052) (0.068)
Pure Stock -0.020 -0.020 -0.018 -0.020 -0.017
(0.565) (0.575) (0.611) (0.565) (0.631)
Toehold -0.098 -0.100 -0.097 -0.095 -0.096
(0.125) (0.118) (0.130) (0.136) (0.131)
Hostile 0.045 0.044 0.047 0.043 0.047
(0.521) (0.526) (0.502) (0.534) (0.503)
Tender Offer 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013
(0.744) (0.744) (0.763) (0.759) (0.774)
Diversifying -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.011
(0.791) (0.749) (0.759) (0.775) (0.735)
Competition 0.094* 0.097* 0.095* 0.091* 0.097*
(0.063) (0.053) (0.059) (0.070) (0.055)
Relative Size 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.010
(0.482) (0.460) (0.411) (0.481) (0.383)
Intercept -0.062 -0.036 -0.053 -0.027 -0.043
(0.671) (0.805) (0.722) (0.853) (0.767)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,529 2,529 2,529 2,529 2,529
Adj R-squared 0.027 0.026 0.028 0.026 0.028
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Table 12: Institutional cross-ownership and deal long-run performance
This table presents the regression results of acquirer long-run operating and stock performance
on institutional cross-ownership characteristics. The OLS regressions are based on a sample
of 2,604 M&A deals that are carried out by U.S. public firms between 1984 and 2014 and
have available observations for the regressions. Following Huson et al. (2004), Guercio et al.
(2008) and Duchin and Schmidt (2013), we compute three year changes in operating return
on assets (∆AROA 3Y) to measure acquirer long-run operating performance after the deal
announcement. Following Barber and Lyon (1996), AROA is adjusted for the median AROA
of a controlled group in which all firms are in the same industry (two-digit SIC code) and have
similar previous ROA (± 10%) in the fiscal year preceding the deal announcement. Following
Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999), we compute acquirer three year buy-and-hold
abnormal stock returns (BHAR 3Y) after the deal announcement with the benchmark being
the return of a control firm stock in the same industry (two-digit SIC code), of similar size (±
30%), with the nearest book-to-market ratio. The primary explanatory variables of interest
are the numbers of top 10 institutional cross-owners. Detailed definitions of all variables can
be found in Appendix A. Year and Fama–French 10 industry fixed effects are controlled for in
all regressions. Regression standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980).
p-values are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels is indicated
by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
∆AROA 3Y BHAR 3Y
1 2 3 4 5 6
Top10Count 0.005** 0.002**
(0.020) (0.015)
Top10CountIndependent 0.007** 0.003***
(0.034) (0.004)
Top10CountDedicated/Quasi-index 0.004* 0.002**
(0.082) (0.024)
IO 0.029* 0.025 0.029* 0.006 0.004 0.006
(0.056) (0.109) (0.059) (0.222) (0.383) (0.197)
Size -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.204) (0.363) (0.277) (0.013) (0.024) (0.016)
B/M -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.384) (0.362) (0.415) (0.770) (0.831) (0.715)
Leverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.340) (0.342) (0.390) (0.244) (0.226) (0.276)
Cashholding 0.020 0.022 0.020 0.005 0.006 0.005
(0.354) (0.309) (0.360) (0.492) (0.421) (0.502)
CF/Equity -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.008** 0.008** 0.007**
(0.911) (0.939) (0.893) (0.045) (0.040) (0.047)
Runup -0.011* -0.012* -0.010* -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.079) (0.065) (0.095) (0.464) (0.371) (0.526)
Sigma 0.253 0.244 0.260 -0.245** -0.250** -0.244**
Continued on next page
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Table 12 – continued from previous page
∆AROA 3Y BHAR 3Y
1 2 3 4 5 6
(0.446) (0.463) (0.434) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017)
Pure Cash 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.468) (0.464) (0.497) (0.634) (0.619) (0.653)
Pure Stock -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.768) (0.789) (0.792) (0.693) (0.708) (0.713)
Toehold 0.034** 0.034** 0.035** -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.376) (0.343) (0.402)
Hostile -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.588) (0.597) (0.576) (0.474) (0.465) (0.486)
Tender Offer -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.360) (0.363) -0.35 (0.650) (0.636) (0.676)
Diversifying 0.005 0.004 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.500) (0.537) (0.508) (0.753) (0.705) (0.753)
Premium -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.701) (0.666) (0.676) (0.225) (0.234) (0.225)
Relative Size 0.001* 0.001* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.078) (0.097) (0.114) (0.694) (0.688) (0.617)
Intercept -0.012 -0.015 -0.012 0.009 0.008 0.009
(0.740) (0.680) (0.744) (0.426) (0.479) (0.426)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,777 1,777 1,777 2,148 2,148 2,148
Adj R-squared 0.041 0.040 0.039 0.029 0.030 0.028
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Table 13: Institutional cross-ownership and information asymmetry: Sub-sample
analyses
This table presents the OLS regression results of the deal performance on the institutional
cross-ownership proxy variables. The sample consists of our initial 2,604 M&A public deals
with non-missing values of all the variables in the regressions. We divide our main sample into
two sub-samples based on the medians of Analyst, the number of financial analysts following.
The low sub-sample includes deals in which targets have below-median analyst coverage in
the fiscal year before the deal announcement, and the high sub-sample includes deals in which
targets have above-median analyst coverage in the fiscal year before the deal announcement.
The dependent variables are short-term and long-term deal performance measures: Synergy,
∆AROA 3Y, and BHAR 3Y. In Panel A–C, the primary explanatory variables of interest are
Top10Count, Top10CountIndependent, and Top10CountDedicated/Quasi-index, respectively.
The coefficients of all the control variables as in Table 11 and Table 12, year fixed effects,
and Fama–French 10 industry fixed effects are suppressed for brevity in the respective columns.
Detailed definitions of the control variables are given in Appendix A. Regression standard errors
are adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). p-values are reported in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗,
∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Synergy ∆AROA 3Y BHAR 3Y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Low High Low High Low High
Panel A. Top10Count
Top10Count 0.061** -0.004 0.012** 0.000 0.002* 0.002
(0.019) (0.554) (0.012) (0.902) (0.062) (0.208)
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,050 948 727 707 893 813
Adj R-squared 0.068 0.058 0.102 0.056 0.064 0.080
Panel B. Top10CountIndependent
Top10CountIndependent 0.078** -0.004 0.016** 0.001 0.004** 0.002
(0.026) (0.698) (0.014) (0.767) (0.022) (0.187)
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1050 948 727 707 893 813
Adj R-squared 0.067 0.057 0.102 0.056 0.066 0.080
Panel C. Top10CountDedicated/Quasi-index
Top10CountDedicated/Quasi-index 0.064** 0.003 0.009* -0.000 0.001* 0.002
(0.018) (0.725) (0.063) (0.935) (0.074) (0.145)
Continued on next page
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Table 13 - continued from previous page
Synergy ∆AROA 3Y BHAR 3Y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Low High Low High Low High
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,050 948 727 707 893 813
Adj R-squared 0.068 0.057 0.098 0.056 0.061 0.080
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Figure 1: Distribution of institutional owners and cross-owners. This bar chart of the
figure presents the annual distribution of average numbers of institutional owners of acquir-
ers and targets and the institutional cross-owners. The institutional cross-owners are defined
as the institutional investors who hold both acquirer and target stocks before the M&A an-
nouncements. The line chart of the figure also presents the distribution of the average ratio of
cross-owners for acquirers and targets for each announcement year. The value on the left axis
denominates the number of institutional owners and the right axis denominates the percent-
age of the cross-owners in total institutional investors. Our sample includes 2,604 M&A deals
between 1984 and 2014. Both the acquirer and the target are U.S. public firms with complete
information in the CRSP and Compustat databases and they have institutional ownership in-
formation from the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13F) database. Detailed
definitions of all variables can be found in Appendix A.
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